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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BILL S. WOODY d.b.a.
'VOODY DRILLING CO.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No.
11732

vs.
BERT RHODES and
VAUGHN RHODES,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
VAUGHN RHODES

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
In this action a Nevada well-driller sued two
brothers upon a promissory note and an alleged oral
contract and for attorneys fees, and obtained a default
judgment against one brother, which judgment was set
aside because there was no valid service of a summons
u1rnn the defendant.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The lower court granted the motion of defendant
Vaughn Rhodes, to set aside and vacate the default
judgment for the reason that there was no valid service
of summons upon him. However, the court did not dismiss the complaint of plaintiff, but, instead, granted
plaintiff an extension of time in which to answer the
counterclaim of the defendant, Vaughn Rhodes, so that
matter could be set for a trial on its merits.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-respondent Vaughn Rhodes seeks to
haYe the appellate court affirm the lower court in its
decision to set aside and vacate the default judgment.
However, the defendant-respondent Vaughn Rhodes
agrees with and consents to appellant's request that the
matter be remanded to the lower court so that it may
be heard upon its merits inasmuch as the matter has
never been dismissed by the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff filed suit in February, 1967, in the First
District Court in Box Elder County, Utah, against the
two defendants claiming that he was entitled to
$4,000.00 upon a promissory note, $1500.00 upon an
alleged oral contract and $800.00 for attorney's fees
(R.15). In attempting service upon the defendants a
2

member of the Box Elder County Sheriff's Department
served a copy of the complaint and a summons at the
home of the defendant Vaughn Rhodes, in Tremonton,
Elder County, State of Utah, by leaving a copy
of the complaint and summons with the wife of Vaughn
Rhodes. (R.18, Defendant's Ex. 3).
The deputy sheriff wrote upon the copy of the
summons left at the home that he:
"served this summons and complaint on the within named defendant Bert Rhodes on the 20 day
of February, 1968, at Trementon, Box Elde r
County, Utah." (Defendant's Ex. No. 3).
0

However, upon the sheriff's Return of the Summons,
deposited with the court, the deputy wrote that he had
served said summons:
"upon the therein named Vaughn Rhodes" (R.
18).
No other service was ever made upon either of the named
defendants (R.24).
\Vhen Vaughn Rhodes later returned to his home
in Tremonton, his wife showed him the summons and
stated that it was for his brother, as indicated by the
writing of the deputy sheriff (R.24). Vaughn Rhodes
had never before received a summons, and believed what
he read. Bert Rhodes is not a resident of the State of
Ctah but rather is a resident of Nevada (R.19,21,24)
hut happened to be in Tremonton on that day because
of the funeral of a family member (R.24). He took the
summons and complaint with him back to Nevada where
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he contacted an attorney who advised him that inasmuch as he was not a Utah resident he need not be concerned about the matter. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I,
R.24). However, the Nevada attorney, James L. Wadsworth, wrote a letter to counsel for plaintiff in Logan,
Utah, in an attempt to explain the erroneous service,
(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. l) but in the letter he, like
the deputy, erroneously reversed the names of the two
brothers, Bert and Vaughn, and indicated that Vaughn
\vas the Nevada resident and Bert was the Utah resident. (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. I) . Then plaintiff became the third party to reverse the brothers names when
he prayed for a default to be entered against Bert
Rhodes, who is and was a Nevada resident. (R.19,20).
In his Precipe and Default plaintiff requested that the
action against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes be dismissed, wrongly stating that he resided in Nevada ( R.
19). The names of the two brothers were later switchell
on the court records in five different places to release
Bert Rhodes and to allow plaintiff to obtain his default
judgment against the defendant Vaughn Rhodes. ( R.
19,20). On April 2, 1968, the judgment by default
was entered against Vaughn Rhodes, for approximately ,
$7,000.00, (R.21) but no notice of the judgment was
ever brought to his attention (R. 25).
1

1

During the last few days of January, an abstracter
discovered the default judgment against the name of
the defen<lant Vaughn Rhodes and brought it to his
attention (R.25). Vaughn Rhodes immediately con4

tacted an attorney and requested him to attempt to remove the default judgment. But when no motion had
been filed at the end of two months he contacted a new
attorney to represent him. A motion to set aside and
vacate the default judgment was filed in his behalf on
April 29, 1969, within three months from the date he
received notice of the judgment. (R. 25,27). Defendant
Vaughn Rhodes also filed an Affidavit in Support of
Motion and an Answer and Counterclaim to the complaint of the plaintiff on that date. (R.22,31).
On May 13, 1969, a hearing was held before the
Box Elder County Court on the motion (R.33). In
presenting his grounds for his motion, defendant
Y aughn Rhodes attempted to show the judgment was
mid when taken because of lack of jurisdiction, and
other grounds, as set out in his affidavit. However,
the court restricted its inquiry to the single issue of
whether or not the defendant had received valid service
(TR.1-14). At the conclusion of the hearing the court
stated it intended to set aside the judgment but allowed
the parties to file briefs in support of their positions
( TR.12). On June 17, 1969, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Order setting aside and vacating the
default judgment on the ground that the defendant
did not receive the required legal notice by summons.
(R.33) On June 24, 1969, the court issued a further
order granting plaintiff an extension of time to July
21, 1969, in which to answer the counterclaim of the
defendant, Vaughn Rhodes, but did not dismiss the ac-
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tion (R.35). On July 3, 1969, plaintiff filed notice of
appeal.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERil
IN SETTING ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDG)IENT UPON THE GROUND THAT THE DEFENDANT, VAUGHN RHODES, DID NO'l'
RECEIVE VALID SERVICE OF A SUMMONS.
r

In its order of June 17, 1969, the District Court
stated in its Findings of Fact and Order:
"That the deputy sheriff in attempting to serve
a copy of the summons upon the defendant petitioner did erroneously write the wrong defendant's name upon the summons left at the petitioner's home and failed to provide this petitioner
and defendant with the notice required under
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R.33)
The law has long been settled in Utah that where
there is no valid service of a summons upon a defendant,
a default judgement is void. See State Tax Commission vs. Larsen, 100 Utah 699, llO P2d 558. And, the
requirements for a valid service of a summons have been
well defined by the courts. In National Farmers Union
Property and Casualty Co. vs. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
286 P2d 249 ( 1956) this court expressed the frequently
quoted guide-line:
6

,

"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and liberalize procedure, we
must not lose sight of the cardinal principle that
under our system of justice, if an issue is to be
tried and a party's rights concluded with respect
thereto, he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it." (p.13).
That and other decisions of the Utah Supreme
Court have clearly determined that the essential requirement of service is that it must provide a party with
such notice as to alert him to the fact that he must respond or waive his rights. The service in this matter diJ
not meet that exacting standard, where the notation 0£
the deputy on the summons expressly stated that he
had served Bert Rhodes, yet he later informed the court
in his affidavit that he had served Vaughn Rhodes.
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Petersen v. Vane, 57 C.A.2d 58, 134 P2d 6, strongly expressed its view that such service does not meet the requirements of the law. There a defendant who was
served as a "fictitious" defendant, appealed from a default judgment. The court there stated:
"Of course, if the process server fraudulently
misleads the person served by telling him that
the summons is for someone else, equity may possess the power to set aside a judgment based on
such service."
'!\Thile in our case there is no evidence that the
deputy's misleading statement was intentional, the effect
is just as harsh and deprived the defendant of his day
in court, the same as if the process server had acted
fraudulently.
7

In the recent Utah case of Rees vs. Scott, 8 Utah
2d 134, 328 P2d 877, a situation strikingly similar to
ours arose. There a deputy sheriff in serving the defendant fail::d to write the date of service on the copy of the
summons left with the defendant, but did write the date
of service upon the copy returned to the court. \ Vhen
that service was challenged the Utah Supreme Court
wisely held that the summons was insufficient and that
the defect could not be disregarded as a mere irregulari- '
ty under Rule 61. \Vhen the plaintiff appealed to the
eourt that the omission was inconsequential the court
stated, concerning Rule 61:
"The above rule is salutary where applicable.
But it cannot be used as a catch-all to cover up
defects, errors, or omissions upon which the rights
and duties of adverse parties depend." (p.135)
It would be difficult indeed to find a fact situation
more closely in line with the facts of this case or to
find a circumstance where the rights of a party are more
dependent upon the requirements of fair notice.
In the earlier Utah case of Columbia Trust Com-

pany vs. Steiner, 71 Utah 498, 267 P 788, the Supreme

Court insisted that the technical requirements in serving
a defendant must be strictly complied with. There ;i
defendant was served, as in our case, by a copy of the
summons being left with the defendant's wife at his
home. A default judgment entered against him mis
appealed on the ground that the summons was not valid.
The court ruled in his favor and concluded that the
8

1

affidavit and proof of service were defective in three
particulars: That the affidavit failed to show that the
person making the service was of qualified age on the
<late of service, even though it showed he was on the
date when he made proof of service; that the affidavit
failed to show the summons which was served at defendant's home was delivered to his "usual place of
abode"; and third, that the affidavit did not state that
the wife of the defendant was over 14 years of age even
though she was a married woman. The obvious intent
of the court was to require a full compliance with the
rnks and to allow the parties their day in court.
In an often cited California case, City of Los Anr;eles vs. Morgan, 105 C.A. 2d 726, 234 P2d 319, where
it was determined that an affidavit of service was
fraudulent, the court stated:
"Under the due process clause of the federal
constitution a personal judgment rendered without service of process on, or legal notice to, a
defendant is not merely voidable, but yoid, in
the absence of a voluntary appearance or waiver."
(p.321)
court then quoted an earlier California decision,
holding:
"It has long been established that a false affidavit of service constitutes extrinsic fraud. A
nartv is thus prevented from having his day in
C:Trl· ,1;
will :·ck,.,-· a rarty from
an w; just judgment rendered against him when,
witl o; 1t service of process, either actual or con9

structive, no opportunity has been given him to
be heard in his defense." (p.322).
The failure of proper _service in our case denied the
defendant Vaughn Rhodes an opportunity to be heard.
For that reason the court properly set aside the default
judgment.
In the recent Utah case of Utah Sand and Gravel
Products Corp. vs. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P2d
703 ( 1964) the defendant appealed a lower court's refusal to set aside a default judgment entered following
service of a summons which was obviously invalid in
its face. The Supreme Court .unanimously reversed the
lower court and set aside the judgment. There Justice
Crockett, writing for the court, stated:

"It is true that our new rules of civil procedure
were intended to eliminate undue emphasis on
technicalities and to provide liberality in procedure to the end that disputes be heard and determined on their merits . . . Liberality in their
interpretation and application should be indulged
where no prejudice or disadvantage to anyone
results, but where failure to comply with the rules
will result in some substantial prejudice or disadvantage to a party, they should be adhered to
with fidelity.

The proper issuance and ser't)ice of a summons
which is the means of invoking the jurisdiction
uf the court and of acquiring jurisdiction o·ocr
the defendant, is the foundation of a lawsuit . .. "
(emphasis added) ( p.409)
10

The court concluded with a strong expression that
whenever possible the merits of a case should be determined.
"Another point raised by the defendant deserves comment. Even if the defect in the summons had been some mere irregularity which
could be cured by amendment, it would be difficult indeed to understand the trial court's failure
to set aside the default judgment. It is in accordance with our rules, and our decisional law,
that where a default has been taken against a
party and there is any justifiable excuse, the
court should be indulgent in setting aside the
judgment to afford him an opportunity for a
trial on merits, and any doubt about such a matter should be resolved in favor of doing so ... "
(p.410)
The court there reemphasized its attitude expressed in
Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corp.) 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d
279, where it said:
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liberally construed' to secure a 'just ... determination
of every action, but they do not represent a oneway street down which but one litigant may
travel .. .'

"Be that as it may, a defendant must be extended every reasonable opportunity to prepare
his case and to meet an adversary's claims. Also
he must be protected against surprise and be
assured equal opportunity and facility to present
and prove counter contentions - else unilateral
justice and injustice would result sufficient to
serious doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees."
11

Based upon all of the foregoing authorities it is
clear that the lower court followed excellent legal precedent when it set aside the judgment based upon an
invalid service.
However, appellant contends that the court was
limited by Rule 60 (b) ( 4) to a three month period
following the entry of the judgment in which to set it
aside, and could not apply Rule 60 (b) (7) and enforce
equity. Appellant contends that the subsections are
exc]usive, but that view is clearly contrary
to the law. Rule 60 (b) ( 7) reads:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may in the f urtherauce of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . ( 7) any other reason j ustif ying relief from the operation of the judgment.
"

The Utah Supreme Court has expressly defilled
the scope of Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) on several occasions. l n
the 1956 case of Ney vs. Harrison, 5 Utah 2d 217, 299
P2d 1114, a default judgment was set aside 11 month-;
after its entry on the ground that a mistake had
occurred. The court explained:
"Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure lists the instances in which a court may,
in the furtherance of justice, open a judgment
obtained by default. Six specific categories are
set forth: . . . In addition, subsection ( 7) permits the judgment to be opened for 'any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of
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the judgment.' Relief upon the first four
grounds must be sought within three months
from entry of the judgment; and upon the others'
within a reasonable time.' Defendant Alda did
not request relief until nearly 11 months had
elapsed, and hence the only applicable section of
Rule 60 ( b) upon which she could rely was ( 7) ."
(p.218)
The court then explained that the appellant's basis
for her motion was mistake, which is expressly provided
for in subsection (I). Then, answering an argument
very similar to appellant's in our case, the court said:
"Plaintiff urges that this type of mistake is
a mistake of law and not within the purview of
Rule 60 (b), and argues that if relief be justified
in this type of case, it will destroy the firmly
established policy that judgments should be
final so that confidence can be reposed in this.
Plaintiff points out that Rule 60 (b) is in derogation of the common law rule that all judgments
become final after the close of the term, and
places reliance on the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictlv construed. 'Ve are aware of such a rule but· it has
no application in the law of this state.
"Our civil code expressly provides:
'The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to
the
of this state ... '
"The statutory authority of a trial court to set
aside judgments obtained by default has been
liberally construed to the end that there be trial
13

o!l the merits, beginning with our earliest deciSIOnS . . .

" 'The allowance of a vacation of judgment is
a creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, whicl1 may
occur through procedural difficulties, the wrongs
of the opposing party, or misfortunes which prevent the presentation of a claim or defense .. .'
"The trial court could well regard this as
among the class of cases that Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) was
intended to govern ...
"The Utah decisions relied upon by plaintiff
recognize the firmly established principle that it
is largely within the discretion of the trial court
whether a default should be relieved, which discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a
patent abuse thereof." (emphasis added.)
An even more recent interpretation of the applicatio:i of 60(b) (7) is found in Board of Education of
Granite School
vs. Cox, 16 Utah 2d 20, 39J
P2d 55 ( 1964). 'Vhere a default judgment was entered
against a husband and wife, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision to set aside the default
judgment in favor of the wife where the husband and
wife were jointly sued but only the husband was served.
Justice Callister, writing for the court, there explained
that the District Court was empowered to set aside the
judgment against the wife by virtue of authority
granted it in Rule 60 ( b) ( 7) , and affirmed the trial
court.
Ptah's Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned upon
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule
14

60(b) subsection (6) is identical to Utah's Rule 60(b)
subsection ( 7). In the authoritative treatise by Barron
and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Wright
Revision ( 1958), Volume 3, p. 420, this very problem is
commented upon:
"The most difficult question with regard to
Rule 60 ( b) ( 6) is whether relief can be had
thereunder for reasons which are mentioned in
the first five clauses of Rule 60 (b), or whether
the reference to 'other reason' makes this clause
and the first five mutually exclusive. The question is important because of time limitations on
moving for relief ... "
The writers then recite the history of the Rule and fully
answer the question they pose by listing numerous
cases where subsection ( 6) has been held to include
relief also available under the first five subsections, had
the motion been made within the statutory time limit.
The authors then conclude:
"[This judicial interpretation] is striking evidence of what a flexible device for avoiding the
time limits of Rule 60 ( b) clause ( 6) provides to
a strong court.
"Thus cases of extreme hardship or injustice
may be brought within a more liberal dispensation than a literal reading of
rule would
allow. And indeed, there is little reason why a
motion or application for relief from a judgment
should not be considered in the same broad persi;ectiYe as an independent action to vacate or
s;t aside the judgment." (emphasis added) (p.
42l))

15

Obviously the Federal interpretation of the scope
the rule is identical with that of the Utah Supreme
Court. Both allow equity in this kind of case.
Finally, appellant claims defendant had notice of
the entry of the default. In his brief on page 2 he
claims that he mailed a copy of the judgment to Attorney \Vadsworth in Nevada. At the hearing he introduced as an exhibit (Plaintiff's Ex. No. 2) a copy of
the letter he claimed to have mailed ( TR.8). Howeyer,
that exhibit is clearly dated April 9, 1969, a full year
after the alleged mailing. Further, Attorney 'Vadshas sworn in an affidavit that he never received
;my communication from plaintiff or his counsel at any
time.
From all the foregoing authorities it is clear that
the district court followed established precedent and
correctly set aside and vacated the default judgment
entered following an invalid service of summons, and
acted pursuant to authority granted it in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT DIS.MISS THE ACTION BY THE PLAINTIFF
AT ANY TIME.
On June 24, 1969, Dne week following the order
of June 17, 1969, vacating the default judgment appealed from, the lower court entered a second order,
granting the plaintiff-appellant additional time in
16

which to answer the counterclaim of this defendant.
Thal order is the final order of the court, and was entered nine days prior to plaintiff-appellant's appeal on
July 3, 1969. The order of June 24, 1969, reads (R.35) :
"Upon the request of Ted S. Perry, Esquire,
counsel for plaintiff, for additional time in which
to answer the counterclaim in this action, plaintiff
hereby is granted an extension of time until July
21, 1969, in which to answer the counterclaim of
the defendant Vaughn Rhodes for the reason
that the counsel for plaintiff has indicated to
the court that it may be necessary for him to
withdraw as counsel for the plaintiff, necessitating the employment of new counsel by plaintiff; and notice is hereby given that unless the
plaintiff files some additional pleadings or motions to show he is diligently prosecuting this
action before July 21, 1969, his complaint may
be dismissed without prejudice."
The order is obviously an attempt to prompt the parties
to file the necessary pleadings so that the matter could
be set for trial upon its merits. The determination of
the court to move the matter forward timely is further
e''idenced by its statement that:
" ... unless the plaintiff files some additional
pleadings or motions to show he is diligently
prosecuting this action before July 21, 1969, his
complaint may be dismissed without prejudice."
The court was attempting to prevent the foreseeable
problems of the defendant obtaining a default judgment
on his counterclaim against the plaintiff which would
further complicate matters. A motion for def a ult was
17

anticipated by the court since 57 days had then passed
since the counterclaim was filed. By the court's order
the pJaintiff was granted a total of 83 days in which to
answer the counterclaim instead of the normal period
of 20 days. It is evident that the appeal upon this point
is not well taken and should be immediately dismissed '
by this court. Plaintiff's counsel was mailed two copies
of the court's order (R.35,42), neither of which ""ere
returned undelivered, so plaintiff was certainly aware
of it.
Respondent, Vaughn Rhodes, is eager to have the
matter set for trial so that the issues may be determined
upon their merits. In his original Motion to set aside
the judgment (R.27) and in his Affidavit in Support
of }lotion ( R.26) he expressly requested a trial
as he did in his Answer and Counterclaim ( R.28) .
For all of the foregoing reasons, responde11 t
Y aughn Rhodes respectfully urges the court to affirm
the judgment of the lower court in vacating and setting
aside the judgment, and to remand the matter for n
tria] upon its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD F. GORDON
Mann and Hadfield
Attorneys for Respondent
Vaughn Rhodes

..i:\l.torney for Respondent
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